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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM REMINE, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
V • 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
Case No. 930752-CA 
Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a 
petition for extraordinary writ brought under Rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This appeal is taken from a decision of the 
district court involving a challenge to a decision of the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (Supp. 1993) because 
Remine was convicted of a second degree felony. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does a challenge to the reasonableness of the Board's 
decision to revoke parole state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, absent a violation of procedural due process? 
2. Given that Remine is using other available legal remedies 
to correct the purportedly false information in his presentence 
information report (PSI) , i.e., a motion to correct sentence before 
1 
the sentencing judge, is Remine entitled to extraordinary relief in 
this action? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 
309 (Utah App. 1992) . Its legal conclusions, however, are reviewed 
for correctness. Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons, No. 930355 
(Utah February 28, 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules 
are attached to this brief as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court dismissing Remine's petition for extraordinary 
relief. (Final Order, Remine v. Utah Board of Pardons. Case No. 
930904287, Honorable Glenn Iwasaki; November 24, 1993; attached as 
Addendum B.)1 Remine filed his petition on July 28, 1993, alleging 
that the Board of Pardons had based its decision to revoke Remine's 
parole based on inaccurate information, i.e., criminal history 
entries contained in the PSI. The PSI is a document created at the 
time of sentencing that reviews the defendant's criminal history 
and provides a synopsis of the crime for which the defendant is 
1
 At the time this brief was being prepared, the district 
court record was neither indexed nor paginated. Therefore, 
throughout this brief, the appellees will cite to the record in 
this manner. 
2 
being sentenced, along with victim impact statements, and, in some 
cases, psychological evaluations. Also, the petition challenges 
the reasonableness of the Board's decision. 
Third District Court Judge Frank G. Noel committed Remine to 
the Utah State Prison on June 1, 1990 to an indeterminate term of 
0 to 5 years. Remine had been convicted of Burglary, a third 
degree felony. After Remine's original parole grant hearing, he 
was given a parole date of April 23, 1993. (Order, Utah Board of 
Pardons and Parole, attached to respondents' Answer and Motion to 
Dismiss, filed August 19, 1993; Addendum C.) 
Approximately one year after his parole, Remine was returned 
to the prison on several allegations of violating his parole 
agreement. However, all but one allegation was dismissed by 
stipulation before the parole revocation hearing occurred; also 
pursuant to that stipulation, Remine pled guilty to the charge of 
failure to reside at his address of record. (Stipulation and 
Motion, attached to respondents' Answer and Motion to Dismiss, 
filed August 19, 1993; Addendum D.) Pursuant to that stipulation, 
Remine, through his attorney, waived his right to present evidence 
regarding guilt or innocence and agreed that the Board should 
consider the disposition of the matter at the next available date. 
(I£.) On May 13, 1993, the Board revoked Remine's parole and gave 
him a new parole date of June 8, 1993, less than one month later.2 
2
 Remine's June 8, 1993 parole date was subsequently 
rescinded. 
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On or about June 13, 1993, Remine filed a motion in his 
criminal case alleging that information in his PSI was incorrect 
and requesting the sentencing court to correct the information. 
(Attached to petition, Motion, Case No. 891901646FS; Addendum D.) 
Judge Frank G. Noel, the sentencing judge, has ordered Adult 
Probation and Parole to review the allegations and respond to the 
motion. (Minute Entry, State v. Remine. Case No. 891901646FS, 
filed October 21, 1993; Addendum E.) To date, no response has yet 
been filed. Also contained in Remine's criminal file is a letter 
from Betsy Bowman of the Legal Defender's Association discussing 
the merits of this motion and requesting that the sentencing court 
make any corrections that are necessary. (Letter from Betsy 
Bowman, Case No. 891901646FS, filed November 12, 1993; Addendum F.) 
Ms. Bowman characterizes Remine's motion as falling within Rule 
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
On July 28, 1993, Remine filed this petition for extraordinary 
relief, alleging that the Board had relied on incorrect criminal 
history information in his PSI when it revoked his parole. Also, 
in general Remine complains about the reasonableness of the Board's 
revocation decision. Remine does not in any way challenge his 
guilty plea. 
The trial court granted respondents' motion to dismiss, 
concluding that Remine had not stated a cause of action and that 
the Board had complied with proper procedures when it revoked 
Remine's parole. 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
All facts relevant to this case are set forth in the Statement 
of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Remine pled guilty to violating a condition of parole. On 
that basis, the Board of Pardons properly revoked his parole. 
Remine's Rule 65B petition does not challenge the validity of his 
guilty plea nor does it directly challenge the Board's authority to 
revoke parole on those grounds. Also, it should be noted that this 
appeal arises from a parole revocation hearing, not an original 
parole grant hearing. 
Instead, Remine infers that the Board considered allegedly 
inaccurate information when it made its determination to revoke 
parole and re-start it on June 8, 1993.3 Also, Remine challenges 
the rationality of the Board's decision, taking issue with the 
particulars of the Board's decision and claiming that the 
revocation decision was inappropriate. 
First, Remine presented no evidence to the trial court that 
the Board, in fact, considered any of the purportedly inaccurate 
information. Second, Remine presented no evidence, other than his 
own allegations, that the records in issue were inaccurate. 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Labrum v. Utah Board 
of Pardons, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1993) , does not require 
remand for two reasons: (1) the Labrum decision was strictly 
limited to original parole grant hearings, not the parole 
revocation hearing here at issue; and (2) Remine has not claimed 
denial of access to information. 
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Therefore, even if the Board used the records in determining 
Remine's parole, that use did not violate Remine's rights to 
procedural due process because the information was not, to the 
Board's knowledge, incorrect. 
Additionally, Remine has availed himself of a plain, speedy, 
and adequate remedy at law to contest the allegedly inaccurate 
information by requesting that the sentencing judge correct the 
information in the PSI. Under Rule 65B(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Remine's resort to this other available remedy, which 
predates this petition, precludes him from receiving the 
extraordinary relief he now requests- Indeed, Remine's post-
sentence motion can provide him all the relief he requests. Should 
Judge Noel grant his motion, completely or even in part, Remine 
will then be able to approach the Board with an order from the 
Court correcting information in the Board's records. At that 
point, the Board will be compelled to correct its records as well 
and treat Remine accordingly. 
However, until Remine has proved in the appropriate forum that 
the information is incorrect, the Board is within its rights to 
consider it in its parole determination and give it whatever weight 
it may deserve. From the face of the petition, it appears that 
Remine saw the information prior to his hearing and was able to 
challenge it. Thus, Remine's procedural due process rights were 
fully respected. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE BOARD'S DETERMINATION TO REVOKE REMINE'S PAROLE BASED 
ON HIS GUILTY PLEA IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
PETITION FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD 
BE GRANTED AND DISMISSED THE PETITION. 
It is now well established that Board's substantive parole 
decisions cannot be reviewed by a court. In Lancaster v. Utah 
Board of Pardons. No. 930355, slip op. at 3 (Utah February 28, 
1994), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "[W]e must review the 
fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its 
sentencing function, but we do not sit as a panel of review on the 
result. . . ." (emphasis in original). This Court also has 
recognized the Board's independence and discretion in several 
cases, affirming the proposition that only the Board can make a 
parole decision, which cannot be reviewed by a court. Renn v. Utah 
State Board of Pardons. 862 P.2d 1378, 1381 n. 6 (Utah App. 1993) 
petition for cert, filed. December 1, 1993; Preece v. House. 848 
P.2d 163 (Utah App.), cert, granted. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993; 
Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd. 227 
Utah Adv. Rep. 90 (Utah 1993). 
To the extent, therefore, that Remine challenges the Board's 
substantive decision to revoke parole, that challenge cannot be 
reviewed by a court. However, as stated in Lancaster, a court can 
review the process used by the Board in exercising that discretion. 
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Lancaster. No. 930355, slip. op. at 3. The trial court apparently 
recognized this distinction, which is evidenced by the statement in 
the trial court's order that "The Board of Pardons has followed 
proper procedures available, and conformed its proceedings to due 
process requirements." (Final Order; Addendum B.) 
In essence, Remine does not complain that the Board has failed 
to comply with procedural due process requirements appropriate in 
the parole revocation hearing.4 The substance of Remine's 
complaint is apparent from the tenor of the allegations, which cast 
doubt on the appropriateness of the items checked off on the 
Board's rationale. This case is, in fact, similar to Northern v. 
Barnes. 825 P.2d at 698, in which this Court recognized that the 
petition was nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to attack 
the substance of the Board's decision through a procedural guise.5 
Remine's attempt should be similarly rejected. 
Additionally, Remine does not challenge his guilty plea, the 
essential element to his parole revocation. Having pled guilty to 
4
 Because this challenge is to a parole revocation hearing 
rather than an original parole grant hearing, due process requires 
somewhat more from the Board. Thus, the petitioner is entitled not 
just to notice of the charges against him, a hearing, and the 
opportunity to present evidence on his behalf, he is also allowed, 
by Utah statute, to have counsel represent him. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-27-11 (Supp. 1993). Remine's petition does not allege a 
deprivation of any of these elements. 
5
 "Northern's claim relates, therefore, not to the procedural 
due process issues outlined in Foote. but to the reasonableness of 
the Board's decision in not granting Northern credit for the time 
served beyond his original parole date." Northern. 825 P.2d at 
698. 
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violating his parole, Remine cannot now be heard to complain about 
the action that the Board took on the basis of that plea. The same 
case law that recognizes the Board's exclusive and unreviewable 
discretion to make parole decisions also makes this revocation 
decision unreviewable. Therefore, because Remine has not claimed 
that his guilty plea was wrongfully taken, and because the courts 
cannot review the Board's decision to revoke parole based on the 
plea, Remine's petition fails to state a cause of action. The 
trial court's dismissal on those grounds was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
REMINE HAS FILED A REQUEST WITH THE SENTENCING COURT TO 
CORRECT INFORMATION IN THE PSI; THEREFORE, BECAUSE REMINE 
HAS AVAILED HIMSELF OF A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE 
REMEDY AT LAW, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF CORRECTING PSI INFORMATION. 
Rule 65B(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a person to 
petition for extraordinary relief only when no "plain, speedy, or 
adequate" remedy is otherwise available. See Crist v. Mapleton 
City. 28 Utah 2d 7# 497 P.2d 633, 634 (1972) ("By ignoring a plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy at law, the plaintiffs placed 
themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus."). 
When he filed his motion to correct information in the PSI, styled 
as a motion to correct sentence by Remine's attorney, Remine 
pursued a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Thus, like 
the plaintiffs in Crist. Remine placed himself out of reach of 
extraordinary relief. Indeed, Remine is pursuing that remedy and 
9 
I 
it is being actively considered, which is evidenced by the minute 
entry order directing Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) to review 
the motion and respond accordingly. (Addendum F). 
In his motion to the sentencing court, Remine alleges that the 
criminal history information in his PSI is incorrect and needs to 
be amended. (id.) Though the legitimacy of Remine1s allegation 
is, as yet, unproved, this method of approaching the problem is the 
correct one because it is the sentencing court, not the Board of 
Pardons that controls the contents of the PSI. Under law, the 
Board of Pardons plays no role in the creation of the PSI nor does 
it influence what information is contained within it. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1993). Still less then does the Board have 
the mandate to change a court-approved PSI. Therefore, Remine 
properly brought his concerns about inaccurate information to the 
sentencing court. It is the sentencing court that reviewed 
Remine's PSI and has the most knowledge about his particular 
criminal case. 
Thus, because Remine's concerns about inaccurate information 
are being handled by the sentencing court in a different case, he 
is not eligible for the extraordinary relief he requests in his 
petition. Should Judge Noel correct any of the information in the 
PSI, then Remine will have the opportunity to present the order and 
the amendments to the Board for its consideration and action. It 
can only be presumed that the Board will act in the appropriate 
manner. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request 
that this Court affirm the trial court's order denying Remine's 
request for relief and dismissing the petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS K day of March 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
J^mes H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the r. ^ day of March 1994, I caused to be 
mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
William Remine 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, Utah 84634 
LiU ^  hu-M 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence - Pleas held in abeyance - Probation - Supervision - Presentence 
investigation - Standards - Confidentiality - Terms and conditions - Restitution - Termination, 
revocation, modification, or extension - Hearings. 
(1) "Confidential" as used in this section means that the disclosure of the presentence 
investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under 
Section 76-3-404, is limited to: 
(a) the court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his counsel for sentencing purposes only; 
(b) law enforcement agencies and other agencies approved by the Department of Corrections 
in the supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; and 
(c) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making process.] 
(2) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Sections 77-2a-l 
through 77-2a-4 and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(3) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime 
or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases 
of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with 
the Department of Corrections. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is 
vested as ordered by the court. The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(4) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and presentence 
investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be 
based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level of 
services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and Board of Pardons on an annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by 
the Department of Corrections. 
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the 
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (a) and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(5) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions, or 
to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, 
the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with 
department standards. 
(6) (a) (i) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of 
the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time 
for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the Department of 
Corrections or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(ii) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the 
payment of restitution by the defendant. 
(iii) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are confidential and are not 
available except by court onler for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial 
Council or for use by the Department of Corrections.] 
(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the 
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court 
on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(c) After the sentencing, the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, and all copies of the presentence 
investigation report, become the property of the Department of Corrections and are for internal 
use of the department only. 
(7) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may be required to 
perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including the community service 
program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance with Subsections 
76-3-201(3) and (4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate. 
(8) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the court, for the 
collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during the 
probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. 
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the cleric of the court. 
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order 
to the parties. 
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(9) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, 
or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes 
outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the 
case and continue the defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation 
for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, restitution, and other amounts 
outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, the court may 
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of 
court or why the suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will occur 
by law. The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details 
on outstanding fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(10) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute 
service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing 
to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation 
of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the 
probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of 
an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(11) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the 
conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine if 
the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of 
probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit, 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall 
present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based 
shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good 
cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present 
evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term commence 
anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
(12) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful and malicious 
injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, 
Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of 
Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of 
sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified 
to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treatment over the defendants described in this subsection. 
(14) (a) The department shall make rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, regarding disclosure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and 
investigation reports to maintain confidentiality of the report. 
(b) Disclosure of a presentence investigation report, including any supplemental diagnostic 
evaluation report, is exempt from the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act. 
77-27-11. Revocation of parole. 
(1) The board may revoke the parole of any person who is found to have violated any 
condition of his parole. 
(2) If a parolee is detained by the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement official 
for a suspected violation of parole, the Department of Corrections shall immediately report the 
alleged violation to the board, by means of an incident report, and make any recommendation 
regarding the incident. No parolee may be held for a period longer than 72 hours, excluding 
weekends and holidays, without first obtaining a warrant. 
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified warrant request 
to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, detain, and return to actual custody a 
parolee, and may upon arrest or otherwise direct the Department of Corrections to determine 
if there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his parole. 
(4) Upon a finding of probable cause, a parolee may be further detained or imprisoned again 
pending a hearing by the board or its appointed examiner. 
(5) The board or its appointed examiner shall conduct a hearing on the alleged violation, and 
the parolee shall have written notice of the time and place of the hearing, the alleged violation 
of parole, and a statement of the evidence against him. The board or its appointed examiner shall 
provide the parolee the opportunity to be present, be represented by counsel, to be heard, to 
present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, absent a showing of good cause for not allowing the confrontation. If heard by an 
appointed examiner, the examiner shall make findings of fact and a decision as to the guilt or 
innocence of the parolee on the alleged violation and then refer the case to the board for 
disposition. Decisions shall be reached by majority vote of the members of the board sitting and 
the parolee shall be promptly notified in writing of the board's findings and decision. 
(6) Parolees found to have violated the conditions of parole may, at the discretion of the 
board, be returned to parole, have restitution ordered, or be imprisoned again as determined by 
the board, not to exceed the maximum term, or be subject to any other conditions the board may 
impose within its discretion. 
(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company 
ADDENDUM B 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
330 South 300 East, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)575-1600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM REMINE, 
Petitioner, FINAL ORDER 
v. 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, et al. , Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
Respondents. Case No. 930904287 HC 
The above-entitled matter came before this Court on November 
8# 1993, for Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. The Petitioner was 
present and represented pro se. Respondents were represented by 
Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. The Court, having 
considered all pleadings, papers, documents and information 
supplied by the parties and contained in its file, and heard 
statements from the parties, entered its ruling. 
The Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSI" 5 OF LAW 
1. The Petitioner has failed to state a cause of action 
under either Rule 65B (b) or 65B (c) . 
Third Jud-c--- *.).*•••»«'* 
MOV 2 A 1S33 
By. ,££*£&--L 
2. Petitioner admits that he is not challenging his 
sentence or his conviction and that both are lawful and legally 
binding upon him. 
3. The Board of Pardons has followed proper procedures 
available, and conformed its proceedings with due process 
requirements. 
Having-made the foregoing conclusions, the Court orders the 
following: 
4. Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is granted; 
5. The relief Petitioner seeks is hereby denied; 
6. The above-captioned case is dismissed with prejudice; 
and 
7. Respondents are entitled to all reasonable fees and 
costs as provided for in Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) (1993). 
DATED this ^Z"day of November, 1993. 
BY THE 
HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Third District Court 
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ADDENDUM C 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
RALPH ADAMS (5433) 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake Cltyf Utah B4111-2525 
Telephone (801) 575-1600 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF TriE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the t STIPULATION AND MOTION 
Hearing of WILLIAM REMINE, s 
USP # 20102 s 
FOR PAROLE VIOLATION I 
COMES NOW i;he Department of Corrections, by and through its 
counsel, Ralph Adams, and William Gary Remine, by and through his 
counsel/ Rose Blakelock, and hereby agree and jointly move the 
Board of Pardon3 as follows, to wit: 
1. To dismiss certain of the allegations contained in the 
Amended Information on Parole dated February 9, 1992, as follows; 
a. Paragraph 1: By having failed to be at his place 
of residence between the hours of 1900 and 0600 on or about March 
2, 1992, in violation of Condition Number 7 of the ISP agreement. 
b* Paragraph 2: By having failed to provide 
verification of employment, at least twice a month on or about 
March 2, 1992, in violation of Condition Number 11 of the ISP 
agreement. 
or Paragraph 3: By having failed to make monthly 
payments towards his final restitution on or about March 3f 1992, 
in violation of Condition Number 12 of the ISP agreement. 
d. Paragraph 4: By having failed to obtain 
verifiable full-time 32 hours per week employment, schooling or a 
combination on or about February 28, 1992, in violation of 
Condition Number 14 of the ISP agreement:. 
e. Paragraph 5: By having failed to file a written 
report with his parole agent weekly as instructed on January 13, 
1992, in violation of Condition Number 7 of the ISP agreement• 
The partiee having stipulated and agreed to dismissal of 
paragraphs 1 through 5 as stated above, jointly move the Board of 
Pardons to convene at its next available date to consider the 
disposition regarding parolees guilty plea to Paragraph 6 of the 
Amended Information on Parole dated February 9, 1992, 
DATED t h i s /£ day of 1993. 
QjZL. 4 f 
ROSE BLAKELOCK 
Attorney for Parolee 
DATED this IS day of 1993. 
RALPH/ADAMS 
Assistant Attorney General 
2. 
ADDENDUM D 
In the Third District Court - Salt Lake County 
The State o f Utah T> • *•;•&£••:•* " ' C a ^ N o . 8 9 1 9 0 1 6 4 6 F S 
Plaintiff 
NOV 1 9 1993 
Wil l iam G. Remine &> * D*£:ty ciunWotion 
Defendant I 
Comes now the defendant to move the court to order the presentence report released to the defendant, 
order AP and P to correct the errors in the presentence report, and withdraw the improper allegations made in 
the presentence report or supply documentation to support them. 
The presentence report contains many minor errors, such as: (1.) MH."- I served 60 days for possession 
of burglary tools, not 90 days; and (2.) The evaluation summary states that I was also charged with a Class A 
misdemeanor which should indicate a Class B. These and many other errors are harmless by themselves but 
combined make them more serious. They should be corrected in the interest of justice. 
The presentence report also shows "It should also be noted the defendant may be charged in another case 
of burglary of a motorhome which shows his continual involvement in the criminal justice system." This 
statement was contrived by AP and P and should be withdrawn or supply supporting documents. 
The "Adult Record" contains little or no truth. The record was contrived by AP and P. I state the 
following: 
1. First offense - is irrelevant, it is traffic not criminal; 
2. Second offense - implies a conviction. This is false the case was not even filed in the courts subsequently 
there can be no conviction; 
3. Third offense - the rape charge was dismissed, the unlawful sexual intercourse charge was amended to 
attempted unlawful sexual intercourse. Conviction a Class A; 
4. Fourth offense - I did not serve 90 days in jail. There was no convection. The court was in error and 
issued a warrant; 
5. Fifth offense - all charges were taken under advisement and later dismissed [see docket attached]; 
6. Sixth offense -1 was not convicted of felony theft, [see criminal history records attached]; 
7. Seventh offense - is correct but should have been verified; 
8. Eighth offense - was convected of possession of burglary tools, Class B, and served 60 days in jail with 
a $1,000.00 fine; 
9. Ninth offense - improper/irrelevant it is a traffic not criminal offense; 
10. Tenth offense - I was not convected and served no jail time. Charges were not filed in court. 
11. Eleventh offense - is irrelevant, an infraction; and 
12. Twelfth offense - not felony theft was burglary of a building the date is wrong. 
The probation/parole history is distorted. On 07/10/85 the court ordered a six (6) month probation and 
a fine of $250.00 [see probation referral]. The court did not order the fine paid at $25.00 per month as AP and 
P alleges. This was a reckless presumption AP and P made that caused an incident. The fine was paid on time 
two (2) months prior to termination of the probationary period. AP and P also recklessly presumed probation for 
twelve (12) months, the order clearly states six (6) months and the court did not extend the probation. AP and 
P did cause incidents with the reckless presumption by requesting a warrant because I only reported for six (6) 
months as the court ordered. The court was in error by issuing the warrant AP and P requested [it also should 
be noted AP and P contrived improper allegations in the incident report when they requested the warrant. The 
allegations have no support and were not based on fact]. The report should be corrected to reflect the facts. AP 
and P clearly caused these incidents with their reckless presumptions. In another case AP and P alleges I 
absconded supervision, their contentions in this matter are unsupported. The courts did not make a finding that 
I absconded. This is just a reckless presumption by AP and P. 
The form that state aggravating and mitigating circumstances is based on records contrived by 
AP and P that are false and incidents caused by AP and P's reckless presumptions. My attitude that AP and P 
was at fault for these incidents should not be used against me. My contentions are well supported by court 
documents (attached) and AP and P's contention conflict with the facts. 
The defendant respectfully request the court to grant this motion in a timely manor, [before 07/18/93] 
so the defendant may have the report for other proceedings [to meet filing deadlines]. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William Remine 06/13/93 
Copy received by AP and P on the thirteenth day of June, 1993. | CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OFAM 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON RLE IN ^ "" 
DISTRICT COURTS SALT_ 
STATE Off U T A ^ / w . J* 
DATE:./ (fMKfjp 
DEPUTY COURT CI 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
: CASE NO: 891901646 FS 
vs. 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
William G. Remine, 
Defendant. 
Now before the Court is defendant's Motion to Correct the Presentence Report. The 
Court has read the Motion together with the State of Utah's reply thereto and now rules as 
follows: 
It appears that the bulk of defendant's complaints center on the criminal history supplied 
to Adult Probation and Parole by the Utah State Bureau of Criminal Identification. The 
presentence report merely contained a compilation of the records provided by the Bureau. In 
that sense, therefore, the presentence report is notin error. Adult Probation and Parole would 
not be in a position to correct the records of the Utah State Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
Defendant also complains of certain errors in his "Probation/Parole History". The State's 
response does not address those issues and accordingly the Court hereby instructs Adult 
Probation and Parole to review their files in connection with this defendant's Probation/Parole 
History and if they conclude that certain errors were made in that history then to correct those 
errors. If Adult Probation and Parole determines that there are no errors in the Probation/Parole 
STATE V. REMINE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
History then they are to report that back to the Court responding to the allegations made by the 
defendant as to the distortion of his Probation/Parole History. 
It should be noted that in any event it does not appear that any of the errors alleged by 
the defendant would be of a type that would change this Court's sentence. 
Dated this -jp/ ~ day of October, 1993. 
STATE V.REMINE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following this day of October, 1993. 
Walter R. Ellett 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William G. Remine 
Defendant Pro Se 
982 East 5600 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Adult Probation and Parole 
275 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM F 
r-. !-- — T - „ 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION^ - -
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300
 4 r f n 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 NOV 2 0 »S3d 
532-5444 
K r- " t • _ 
Established in 19bJ 
JOHN HILL By ^ fT i - r 
)irec o 
)ARD OF TRUSTEES November 12 , 1993 
/I! MITSUNAGA 
zhairman 
GILBERT ATHAY 
LOMON CHACON 
)NELH FRANKEL 
SEPH A GETER 
Y GROUSSMAN 
N HINDE 
RAND H1RSCHI 
CAROL NESSET-SALE 
HN OCONNELL 
ANTH PALMER 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: State vs. William Remine 
Case No. 891901646FS 
Dear Judge Noel: 
I have represented Mr. Remine in the past and he has asked our 
office for assistance in a pro se motion ("Motion, (copy attached) 
") he filed on about June 13, 1993 before you honor. Mr. Hill has 
asked me to assist Mr. Remine. 
As I understand Mr. Remine, his concern is that the sentence 
imposed by your honor was illegal because of what he believes was 
inaccurate information in the pre-sentence report which was relied 
upon at the time of sentencing, so I believe his motion is really 
a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence under Rule 22(e), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure# Rule 22(e) states, "The court may 
correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time." 
I believe Mr. Remine would like an evidentiary hearing to 
challenge the information contained in the pre-sentence report so 
that you could consider re-sentencing him to, as he states it, 
"correct an illegal sentence." It would seem the recent case of 
State v. Nuel Harris, 930034-CA filed October 14, 1993 (copy 
attached) is supportive of Mr. Remine's position. Unlike Harris, 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
November 12, 1993 
Page 2 
Mr. Remine has opted to have your honor reconsider the sentence 
rather than have an appellate court review the matter at this time. 
Please feel free to contact me if I can be of further 
assistance. 
Sincere 
ELIZABETH A 
Attorney at Law 
CC: Wi11iam Remine 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, „ SALT LAKE ,00l» 
